The dots do matter: how to scam a Gmail user
I recently received an email from Netflix which nearly caused me to add my card details to someone else’s Netflix account. Here I show that this is a new kind of phishing scam which is enabled by an obscure feature of Gmail called “the dots don’t matter”. I then argue that the dots do matter, and that this Gmail feature is in fact a misfeature. Finally I’ll suggest some ways the Gmail team can combat such scams in future. But first, I’ll show you the email:
“Odd,” I thought, “but OK, I’ll check.”
The email is genuinely from
so I clicked the link.
It logged me in and took me
to an “Update your credit or debit card” page,
which is genuinely hosted on
No phishing here.
But hang on, the “Update” page showed my declined card as
A card number I don’t recognize.
Checking my records, I’ve never seen this card number.
What’s going on?
I finally realized that this email is to
I normally use
firstname.lastname@example.org, with no dots.
You might think this email should have bounced,
but instead it reached my inbox,
because “dots don’t matter in Gmail addresses”:
If someone accidentally adds dots to your address when emailing you, you’ll still get that email. For example, if your email is email@example.com, you own all dotted versions of your address:
Netflix does not know about this Gmail “feature”.
firstname.lastname@example.org are different identities,
and should have their own Netflix accounts.
I signed up for Netflix account N1 backed by
email@example.com in 2013.
But in September 2017, someone, let’s call her “Eve”,
created a new Netflix account N2, backed by
Eve has access to account N2 because she set its password when signing up,
but I also have access to the account because I own
and so I can follow the password reset process for this account.
I did so.
Eve loves her TV!
She’s watched 587 titles in six months,
all from her “Android Device” in Alabama.
She watched three seasons of Trailer Park Boys over a single day in October.
She consumed nearly every day until 22nd March,
when Netflix put her account “on hold” due to payment failure.
Eve had paid for these shows.
She paid $13.99 every month for her Premium plan,
until February when her card
**** 2745 (also billed to Huntsville, Alabama) was declined.
Perhaps this was all a mistake? Perhaps Eve is actually one of the twelve James Fishers in Huntsville, AL, and perhaps he typed his email address in wrong when he signed up months ago. Netflix doesn’t do any email address verification when you sign up; you can start watching shows straight away.
But perhaps this was not a mistake but a scam. I was almost fooled into perpetually paying for Eve’s Netflix access, and only paused because I didn’t recognize the declined card. More generally, the phishing scam here is:
- Hammer the Netflix signup form
until you find a
gmail.comaddress which is “already registered”. Let’s say you find the victim
- Create a Netflix account with address
- Sign up for free trial with a throwaway card number.
- After Netflix applies the “active card check”, cancel the card.
- Wait for Netflix to bill the cancelled card.
Then Netflix emails
james.hfisherasking for a valid card.
- Hope Jim reads the email to
james.hfisher, assumes it’s for his Netflix account backed by
jameshfisher, then enters his card
- Change the email for the Netflix account to
firstname.lastname@example.org, kicking Jim’s access to this account.
- Use Netflix free forever with Jim’s card
Where is the security flaw here?
Some would say it’s Netflix’s fault;
that Netflix should verify the email address on sign up.
But using someone else’s address on signup only cedes control of the account to that person.
Others would say that Netflix should disallow the registration of
but this would force Netflix and every other website
to have insider knowledge of Gmail’s canonicalization algorithm.
Still others would say that Netflix’s “update your payment details” email
should force a manual login,
instead of using an authenticated link.
Some blame lies with Netflix, but I believe the main problem lies with Gmail, and specifically Gmail’s “dots don’t matter” feature. The scam fundamentally relies on the Gmail user responding to an email with the assumption that it was sent to their canonical address, and not to some other address from their infinite address set.
Some Gmail power users might claim:
“The dots-don’t-matter feature is great.
I get ownership of an infinite set of email addresses!”
But firstly, no one wants this infinite set of email addresses.
Those who really want infinite addresses already have the “plus labelling” feature:
I also own
email@example.com et cetera.
Plus labelling has similar scam potential, but some legitimate use cases.
But I have certainly never wanted
and John Smith never wanted
I have never asked someone for her email address only for her to reply,
firstname.lastname@example.org, but feel free to add the dot wherever you like.”
Each Gmail user has one email address that they think of as theirs;
all the others are mistakes.
Not only do Gmail users not want these extra addresses, most are not even aware that they have these addresses. I’m sure my parents are unaware that they own an infinite set of email addresses. They won’t know this, because Google have never told them, and this is not how email works anywhere else. Even the most technically minded Gmail power user refers to “my email address”, not to “my infinite set of email addresses”.
Even those Gmail users who are aware of their infinite set of addresses are probably unaware of the scams that this exposes them to. We teach people about “phishing” due to emails from dodgy email addresses, but we don’t teach people anything about phishing due to emails to dodgy addresses. Nevertheless, the result is the same: the victim loses money to someone else.
And even in the rare case that a Gmail user is aware of their infinite set of addresses, and they’re aware of the phishing attacks that this can expose them to, this user is unlikely to pick up on it, because the user interfaces of Gmail and Inbox don’t hint anything about a possible scam. In fact it barely even acknowledges that the email was to a non-standard address. The only clue in the screenshot above is that the interface says “to james.hfisher”, instead of “to me”.
The Gmail team should combat this kind of phishing.
They should officially acknowledge that dots-don’t-matter is a misfeature.
Indeed, the Gmail team admitted that dots-don’t-matter is “confusing” way back when they announced the feature in 2008.
Each Google account should have one variant configured as its standard address;
I would set
email@example.com as standard,
and maybe John would set
firstname.lastname@example.org as standard.
If an email is sent to a non-standard address,
it should be shown with a warning:
Finally, Gmail users should be able to opt out of dots-don’t-matter.
I wish for any mail sent to
email@example.com to bounce instead of reaching my inbox.
The dots-don’t-matter feature should be disabled by default for any new Google accounts,
and eventually retired.
This article has spread around the web. I’ll do a full follow-up soon. In the meantime, here are some links:
- Bruce Schneier’s analysis.
- The Hacker News post.
- Twitterers twittering on Twitter, including some Google/Netflix engineers.
More by Jim
- The inception bar: a new phishing method
- The hacker hype cycle
- Project C-43: the lost origins of asymmetric crypto
- How Hacker News stays interesting
- My parents are Flat-Earthers
- The dots do matter: how to scam a Gmail user
- The sorry state of OpenSSL usability
- I hate telephones
- The Three Ts of Time, Thought and Typing: measuring cost on the web
- Granddad died today
- Your syntax highlighter is wrong